Add M10.9c-1 session fuzzing and in-process abuse tests
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ADR-0097. A libFuzzer target for session protocol v4, grants, tickets and
snapshot assembly (canonical re-encoding, verifiers always refuse, a
completed snapshot is applied), with the code under test compiled in, and
a seeded smoke CTest of the same target on every platform. Four
quic-sessions abuse tests measure an honest session tick by tick under a
Hello flood (garbage, untrusted grants, silence), a datagram flood, a
slow peer and a connect/disconnect storm; it keeps every snapshot and
receipt while connections and retained state stay bounded.

evo-session-probe run --grants FILE [--grant N] logs in from an existing
bundle (a dev renewal's) without an issuer key. client_lifecycle uses
SDL_getenv (MSVC rejected std::getenv).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
dingo
2026-10-07 22:57:45 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent fe43706395
commit 5f587f80e1
12 changed files with 597 additions and 26 deletions
@@ -155,3 +155,43 @@ snapshots.
limit, and the 32 established sessions are unaffected. Prediction errors were 0 (no
loss on loopback), and no client starved at any step. The host step dominates the work;
the session layer stays near 0.25 ms per session (budget 0.5).
## 10.9c-1 abuse suite: fuzzing and in-process abuse (2026-10-07)
- **Fuzzing** (`tests/fuzz/session_fuzz.cpp`). For any input:
- `decode_session` never crashes, and an accepted message has a stable canonical form
(decode, encode, decode, encode gives the same bytes);
- an accepted snapshot chunk reaches the client's assembler without crashing;
- `GrantVerifier` and `HandoffVerifier` refuse the bytes, as they do the grant slot of a
decoded Hello. Each holds a real key, so an acceptance would mean a claim byte was
trusted before the signature.
Two builds:
- `evo-session-fuzz`: libFuzzer with ASan and UBSan behind `EVO_BUILD_FUZZER`, with the
session codec, replication, motion, control and verifier sources compiled in so
coverage instruments them;
- `session-fuzz-smoke`: CTest, label `network`, on every platform. It feeds 68,000
seeded inputs: random bytes, and bit flips, truncations, extensions and edge-byte
overwrites of an encoding of every v4 message type.
- **In-process abuse** (`quic-sessions`). Each test measures an honest session tick by tick
while the abuse runs. It must keep at least 90 % of its snapshots and admitted receipts,
and the server's connections and retained state must stay bounded:
- **Hello flood:** 160 raw connections over 40 ticks, sending garbage (closed with
`protocol`), well-formed Hellos signed by an untrusted key (`unauthenticated`), or
nothing (`timeout`). Connections stay within the transport bound of 32, and the region
returns to the honest connection alone.
- **Datagram flood:** an authenticated peer sends hundreds of intentions per tick for any
tick. They are throttled per session (one per tick, refused receipts), and garbage
then closes the peer (`protocol`).
- **Slow peer:** an established client that never reads or acknowledges anything. The
server retains at most its baselines for it (392 entities against a bound of 490).
- **Storm:** 120 logins across 12 accounts, half closed politely and half vanishing. The
region returns to one session and one connection.
- **Probe:** `evo-session-probe run --grants FILE [--grant N]` logs in with grant N of an
existing bundle, such as one from the dev renewal, without an issuer key. It is covered
by the M10 process test and was used against evolution-dev, where the login was welcomed
and its intention admitted. That region runs without synthetic inputs, as the Git
policy requires, so nothing is simulated there outside a drill.
- **Not yet (10.9c-2):** lease loss and SIGKILL with 20 or more `evo-load` bots attached,
and a live raw-UDP sender of mutated datagrams. Our client endpoint caps its own send
rate, so it cannot load the server's per-connection datagram cap (64, newest wins, with
an O(queue) eviction scan); the raw sender measures that.