ADR-0097. The first evolution-dev load drill (image 6c96629e) did not
measure capacity: the governor refused six seconds after the restart with
no session (p95 over a window of only startup ticks), and the bots spent
their grants retrying every 2 s. Reference numbers with one session: tick
work p95 4.0 ms with 33 ms spikes, session layer p95 0.68 ms.
- The governor acts on work only over a full 40-tick window; tick debt
still counts at once.
- evo-load backs off 10 s after a load refusal and, in bundle mode,
reuses the grant the region refused before using it.
- The drill waits for a calm load-report before the bots start, takes the
drill pod's whole log before restoring (the live follow died), and
confirms the restore against a pod other than the drill pod.
Refreshes the dev session window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ADR-0097. tools/ops/load-drill.sh (runbook docs/networking/M10_LOAD_DRILL.md)
runs the evolution-dev reference qualification: synthetic inputs on for
the run (the ADR-0073 drill-time override, restored on exit), bundle-mode
evo-load bots through the public route, and each step's hold matched with
the server's reports. evo-server logs "m10 load-report" every 10 s, since
the agent cannot reach the ops port. evo-load gains --grants FILE
--grants-per-bot C, exhausted=, hold_utc= and close_reasons=;
evo-session-probe grants gains --accounts N.
Finding: Mbed TLS/PSA are built without MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, and bots on
different threads verifying their first connections at once were refused
as untrusted (two per smoke run). One process-wide recursive crypto lock
now guards every network-library entry point that touches them; the
smoke went from 2/2 failing to 3/3 clean. quic-transport adds a
concurrent-connect test. Refreshes the dev session window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>