# ADR-0017: Network transport and security ## Status Transport proposed; server authority/no custom cryptography locked. [ADR-0082](0082-dev-session-transport.md) applies this to the M9 dev session only (TLS 1.3 over a stream with Mbed TLS 4.1.1); the M10 transport remains open. ## Context Superseding state and durable decisions need distinct delivery and trust contracts. ## Decision Keep application semantics transport-neutral; compare QUIC streams+DATAGRAM with DTLS-protected UDP plus mature reliability. Own replication/perception/application logic; use maintained crypto implementations. ## Alternatives Considered TCP/TLS all traffic is simple but head-of-line behavior needs measurement; early Steam-specific coupling limits portability; homemade encrypted transport rejected. ## Benefits Established security with perception-aware replication and independent identity provider. ## Costs Reconnect/channel/window/rate/epoch tests and dependency review. ## Risks Replay/parser abuse, hidden-information leakage, obsolete crypto and compromised workers. ## Consequences Measure loss/latency/MTU/NAT/platforms/binary size/license/maintenance, then pin. Fuzz and adversarial tests gate multiplayer. Worker compromise requires scoped durable constraints/audit, not only client authority. [QUIC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000.html), [DATAGRAM](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9221/), [DTLS1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147/).