# ADR-0020: Gitea delivery and a manual dev verification Job ## Status Accepted for the foundation delivery requested by the maintainer. This does not adopt a persistent server deployment. Registry/runner placeholders are explicitly permitted; the maintainer will create the Argo application manually. ## Context The repository is hosted at git.aeternalisgames.com/dingo/AEvolution. Harbor is registry.aeternalisgames.com, project aeternalis, repository aevolution. The maintainer's successful run 1399 confirms the ubuntu-22.04 runner label and robot secret names. The Argo source is not yet inspected. The executable is a finite headless proof; it has neither a serving loop nor durable world ownership. ## Decision Use native Gitea Actions with a configurable Linux Docker runner. Build Linux checks in explicit container stages: GCC14 Debug/Release, LLVM19 formatting and analysis, ASan/UBSan, seeded bounded fuzzing, and a separate TSan job. Keep the existing Windows check script for the verified MSVC development workflow. After checks, build and smoke-test the runtime image. Publish from main only when the Harbor project is configured, using separately scoped robot secrets. Emit a unique commit/run tag and the registry digest. No cluster or Argo credentials go into CI. Review and commit the digest to dev Kustomize before manual Argo sync. Deploy the proof as a finite, stateless Sync-hook Job in evolution-dev. No Service, PVC, database, region process, scheduled run or World0 resource is introduced. Keep bootstrap Argo/project/namespace templates outside the workload source path. An unresolved image marker deliberately cannot run. The operator must replace it. ## Alternatives Considered GitHub workflows would target the wrong forge. A Deployment would restart a successful finite process. A CronJob introduces unrequested recurring work. Cluster build privileges and Argo credentials are unnecessary for this manual delivery path. Host-installed compilers are less explicit than container stages. Argo Workflows remains the later orchestrator for soak/clone/migration jobs. ## Benefits One executable crosses build, container and Kubernetes boundaries without adding simulation dependencies. Publishing and deployment remain independently reviewable. The application needs no runtime network access or persistent state. ## Costs The existing Linux Docker runner and Harbor project/robots are reused. Container checks consume builder cache and require trusted package repositories. Dev bootstrap uses an Ubuntu tag; distro package versions are captured, not fully reproducible. Production promotion requires a reviewed base digest, retained SBOM, scan/signature and package provenance; this scaffold is not that release gate. ## Risks Docker access is privileged: use isolated runners for untrusted contributions and never grant them production credentials. TSan may expose host-runtime limitations; do not bypass a failed job or weaken host security to conceal them. Jobs can run more than once; this is safe only because the proof has no external side effects. Manual sync is an operational action even though the workload is bounded. ## Consequences The latest completed hook stays available until the next full sync replaces it. Collect logs first; selective sync skips hooks. No automated sync, prune, cascade finalizer or namespace-creation option is enabled. Persistent deployment decisions remain under ADR-0018 and M7/M8 gates. A workflow existing is not evidence it ran. Sources: [Gitea variables](https://docs.gitea.com/usage/actions/actions-variables/), [Gitea runner](https://docs.gitea.com/runner/), [Argo hooks](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/resource_hooks/), [Kubernetes Jobs](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/). ### TSan test-container exception (2026-09-19) Run 1400 demonstrated Clang19 failing before main because Docker's build sandbox blocked personality(ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE). Compile TSan in the image build, then run CTest in a non-root, networkless, capability-free container with a read-only root and bounded tmpfs test-output directories. No host ASLR/sysctl change and no seccomp=unconfined or privileged container is used. The CI profile generator downloads Moby's maintained Apache-2.0 default seccomp profile at commit 245180c51918481c0525424b3ee025d2b435d46c and verifies SHA256 785b2429264afba4d594320337cb17f144f3c7d51585f9805eef72e28f4f9334. It adds exactly one argument-constrained allow rule: personality(0x40000), PER_LINUX with ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE. This deliberately disables ASLR only for sanitizer processes requiring a fixed shadow layout. All other default rules remain. The profile is not part of the game image or Kubernetes runtime configuration. Review/removal owner: foundation/toolchain maintainers when TSan no longer requires this call. The tradeoff is a pinned upstream network fetch and profile maintenance, rather than vendoring a large allowlist or permitting every syscall. Failed tests still block publication. Evidence: [Docker seccomp](https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/seccomp/), [LLVM19 runtime](https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/blob/llvmorg-19.1.1/compiler-rt/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cpp), [pinned Moby profile](https://github.com/moby/profiles/blob/245180c51918481c0525424b3ee025d2b435d46c/seccomp/default.json).