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aevolution/docs/architecture/NETWORK_ARCHITECTURE.md
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Add M10.3a account-bound session grants and region session control
Provider-independent 128-bit AccountIds; ECDSA P-256 session grants v1 signed by
issuer keys and verified by regions with public keys only, the environment byte
signed so dev grants never verify in stage or World0. Per-account serials make the
newest grant win: replay and older stolen grants are refused, a newer grant replaces
the account's session, and refresh renews in place. Attempt rates and capacities
are bounded. The evo_identity library provides the provider, account directory and
grant issuer interfaces with a dev-only test provider. ADR-0091.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 20:54:04 -04:00

5.5 KiB

Authoritative network architecture

Status: locked server authority and untrusted clients; transport/reliability are proposals for M10. M10 timing and workload budgets: ADR-0089 and m10-budgets-v1. M10 transport: QUIC via msquic with OpenSSL (ADR-0090): bounded DATAGRAM and reliable-stream channels with exact CA pinning (evo_network_quic, M10.2b); loss/head-of-line measurements (M10.2c, M10_TRANSPORT_MEASUREMENTS) confirm superseding state on DATAGRAMs and reliable actions on the ordered stream. Session identity and control (ADR-0091, M10.3): ECDSA-signed account-scoped grants (session-grant-v1), newest grant wins. The scoped M9 dev session (TLS 1.3, protocol v1, dev-only grants) is specified in DEV_SESSION_PROTOCOL and ADR-0082. M0 has no networking. Steam distribution follows later through an identity-provider adapter; core account IDs are independent of Steam IDs.

flowchart LR
  S[Steam identity provider] --> A[Identity adapter / backend]
  C[Custom desktop client] <-->|HTTPS identity / world / history| A
  A -->|short-lived region-scoped session grant| C
  C -->|authenticated bounded intentions| R[Region network host]
  R -->|ordered commands| W[Simulation owner]
  W -->|views / outcomes| R
  R -->|perceived deltas / ACKs / durable events| C

Channel contracts

Channel Information Delivery contract
Realtime Movement/orientation intentions and superseding snapshots Prefer datagrams; sequence/drop obsolete state; bounded loss recovery
Reliable gameplay Mutation choice, reproduction, death, region transfer Idempotent action/event IDs; retry; outcome ACK after durable commit
Backend Identity, world selection, friends, lineage/history/admin HTTPS or justified gRPC; provider validation and least-privilege API scopes

InputFrame includes protocol/session/region epoch, sequence, intended tick, bounded movement/orientation, action flags and validated interaction reference. Clients cannot author position, damage, energy, resources, genome, reproduction or death. Validate lengths, numeric ranges/non-finite values, sequence window, target relevance, session ownership, action prerequisites, rates and expiry before admitting bounded commands. Reject unsupported required protocol versions. Do not deserialize directly into trusted native structs.

Snapshot includes region/epoch, server tick, acknowledged simulated input sequence, baseline ID, perception-filtered state and events. Recovery also exposes the durable commit watermark. Receipt ACK means bytes accepted; simulated ACK means input applied; final biological outcome means durable. These are not aliases.

Prediction and interest boundaries

Client predicts only approved local motion using shared versioned rules. It keeps bounded unacknowledged intentions. On authoritative snapshot, restore local state at ACK, discard acknowledged inputs, replay remaining ones, and visually smooth correction. Remote entities interpolate buffered snapshots with bounded extrapolation; loss requests a fresh baseline. Death/mutation/reproduction remain server decisions. Bound retained baselines, input buffers and packet work.

Proposed interface: PerceptionView(observer, tick) → perceptible entity/field facts; InterestPolicy(session, view, budget) → replication set and granularity. Do spatial coarse filtering before biological perception. Poor vision cannot receive hidden exact transforms; scent may expose a directional field, echolocation a derived acoustic result. Rendering receives no arbitrary player/NPC/level labels. Social friend identification is a separate authorized policy. Implement simple spatial interest first; M0 does not implement sensory networking.

Reliability and security experiments

Compare established authenticated datagram/reliable transports (including a library-backed UDP security channel and QUIC options) against an owned selective reliability layer. Measure loss/reorder/duplication, head-of-line delay, MTU/ fragmentation, congestion, NAT routing, CPU, bandwidth and platform support. Do not choose raw unauthenticated UDP or invent cryptography. The final protocol ADR must name the maintained implementation, exact version, license, cipher configuration and threat review. Custom replication/game protocol does not require custom TLS, encryption, key exchange or random nonces.

Use short-lived world/region/account-scoped grants, authenticated key establishment, replay windows, rate/byte/work caps, server input scheduling windows and timeouts. Reconnect cannot duplicate control grants. Secrets never enter logs or gameplay snapshots. Network identities map to current ownership epoch; stale region responses/handoff tickets fail. Administrative APIs and storage credentials are separate from client sessions. Game workers have only region-scoped operations; a compromised process remains a threat requiring isolation and audit, not merely client validation.

Required tests before M10 acceptance: fabricated/oversized/truncated packets, NaN/overflow, replayed actions, sequence wrap/old baselines, duplicate/reordered reliable messages, speed/mutation/resource cheats, flooded sessions, dropped ACKs, lease/handoff races, reconnect uniqueness, sensory information leaks and bounded queue overload. Demonstrate 20+ simulated clients, then measure higher load with latency/loss and authoritative-state divergence reports.