Review P1: the v2 attribute-only runtime role check accepted a login that inherits pg_write_all_data, which can UPDATE lease rows directly and bypass fencing. apply.sql now audits, on every migrate run, the runtime group and all transitive members: privileged attributes, any membership outside the group (inherited or SET-able), table privileges in evolution (including PUBLIC), CREATE rights and EXECUTE beyond the five fenced functions. 0002 and its checksum are unchanged. CI reproduces the bypass and proves each configuration is rejected and rolled back. Review P2: valid(LeasePolicy) bounds every term by the duration before arithmetic; LeaseAuthority validates durations before deadline math and renewal_unknown ignores impossible (>60s) and fences non-positive requests. Extreme min/max tests reproduce the old UBSan overflow and now pass. Validated: Windows CTest 55/55; WSL Release, clang-tidy and ASan/UBSan private-PostgreSQL suites. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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PostgreSQL bootstrap (M7.2) and region fencing (M7.3)
ADR-0059 pins server/libpq 18.6. evo::postgres is optional, Linux-only and separate
from all simulation targets. Preparation explicitly downloads a verified source
archive; ordinary CMake configure does not fetch anything. PostgreSQL license is
permissive; source COPYRIGHT and system TLS license information must accompany
distributed tooling. No custom hashing/cryptography is introduced.
Local isolated verification
Linux prerequisites: GCC14, CMake>=3.28, Ninja, make, bison, flex, curl, bzip2, OpenSSL development headers and zlib development headers. Optional clang19 tools support analysis/ASan. Run as a normal user, not root:
bash tools/prepare-postgres.sh
cmake --preset release -B build/postgres -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER=g++-14 \
-DEVO_BUILD_POSTGRES=ON -DPostgreSQL_ROOT="$PWD/.cache/postgres/install"
cmake --build build/postgres --target evo-postgres-tests --parallel 2
bash tools/ci/postgres-check.sh "$PWD/build/postgres/evo-postgres-tests"
The test script overrides all connection coordinates and creates a new private
0700 /tmp directory, private Unix socket and disposable local cluster. It creates
the evo_runtime_test group and the evo_runtime_login member, then runs fencing
tests as that real runtime login. TCP is off;
local trust applies only inside that private directory. Cluster stops on exit;
logs/data are retained there for diagnosis. It never uses production PG credentials
or deletes a pre-existing database. Do not point this script at a shared server.
Adapter contract
One connection belongs to one I/O owner; one outstanding parameterized statement. No hidden threads, pool, transaction replay or automatic reconnect. Connections and queries take 1..30000ms deadlines on a steady clock. Remote hostaddr must be numeric, host supplies TLS identity, CA file is explicit, TLS verify-full required. Local sockets require no PGHOSTADDR/PGSERVICE override. GSS negotiation is disabled. Query SQL <=16KiB, <=16 parameters of <=4KiB, response <=128 rows/16 columns/64KiB decoded values; single-row mode prevents accumulating a whole result set. A single server field is allocated by libpq before its length can be checked: this is not an arbitrary-query memory sandbox. Only trusted bounded persistence SQL is admitted. Server statement/lock timeouts default to 10s/5s; callers choose shorter I/O deadlines.
Admission config/bounds errors send nothing. SQL errors include only SQLSTATE and require caller rollback when inside a transaction. Receive bounds, network errors and deadlines close the connection and report unknown: a mutation may have committed. Resolve durable request IDs at M7.5; never treat disconnect as rollback. Allocation exceptions propagate to the host boundary; do not catch and reuse an incomplete session. No PostgreSQL diagnostic strings or connection values are logged.
Migrations and privilege boundary
tools/migrate-postgres.sh uses psql environment/service files, no URI arguments.
It requires exactly server 18.6 and serializes migrations with a transaction
advisory lock. It hashes each checked-in SQL file and applies everything in one
transaction. The recorded history must be an exact prefix: clean->v1->v2, v1->v2,
or a v2 no-op. Unknown versions, checksum changes and partial foreign schemas fail
closed. There is no down migration or destructive repair. The u64 domain rejects
fractional, negative and above-u64 values without signed truncation.
Use a dedicated owner/migrator login with CREATE on the database. Before
migrating, operators create a NOLOGIN runtime group role and pass its name as
EVO_PG_RUNTIME_ROLE. The runtime login is a separate member of that group only.
Every migrate run, including a no-op, audits effective privileges of the group and
every role transitively in it, and rolls back on any violation:
- privileged attributes or owner identity;
- membership in any other role, whether inherited or SET-able (for example
pg_write_all_data); - any table privilege in
evolution, including via PUBLIC; - CREATE on the schema, the database or
public; - EXECUTE outside the five fenced functions.
Attribute checks alone are not enough: a login with
pg_write_all_datacan update lease rows directly. Rerun the migrate Job after adding or changing runtime logins or grants; it is the audit. Grants made later without a rerun are not detected. Bootstrap revokes PUBLIC access to the schema, tables and default function execution. Operators own database/role provisioning; the migration never creates logins or passwords, and never grants superuser.
Fenced region ownership (schema v2, ADR-0060)
The runtime role has schema USAGE and EXECUTE on five SECURITY DEFINER functions:
acquire_region_lease, renew_region_lease, release_region_lease,
load_region_head and advance_region_head. It cannot read or write tables, create
objects, call check_region_lease or provision regions. Each mutation locks the lease row
and checks holder, epoch and expiry with clock_timestamp() after the lock wait.
Clients never send times. Rejections: EVL01 busy, EVL02 fenced, EVL03 head mismatch,
EVL04 not provisioned, EVL05 epoch/sequence exhausted, 22023 invalid arguments.
evo::postgres maps them to LeaseStoreError; a timeout or broken connection is
unknown.
Genesis is operator-only (owner login), never done by recovery or runtime:
SELECT evolution.provision_region(world, region, frame, genesis_commit_uuid, '\x<64 hex digest>');. In schema v2 the head is an identity/digest pointer with no
payload binding. Do not provision real world state before M7.4 publication.
Hosts use LeaseAuthority with LeasePolicy defaults: 20 s lease, 5 s renewal
interval, 2 s safety margin, 2 s renewal deadline and 5 s commit deadline. The
local deadline runs from request send time on CLOCK_BOOTTIME. If a renewal outcome
is unknown, keep the earlier deadline and reconnect. Once fenced, stop admission,
simulation and output, then acquire a new epoch and recover. Never resume the old
epoch.
Kubernetes Secrets
Create Secret evolution-postgres-migrator in evolution-dev outside Git. Keys:
pg_service.conf, pgpass, ca.crt. The service file has section
[evolution-migrator] with host, numeric hostaddr, port, dbname, user,
sslmode=verify-full, sslrootcert=/run/postgres/ca.crt and connect_timeout=5.
pgpass uses libpq's escaped host:port:database:user:password format. Do not paste
values into chat, manifests or image arguments. Configure cluster Secret RBAC and
encryption at rest through the existing platform policy.
The example Job mounts the Secret read-only; the entrypoint copies pgpass into a private 0600 temporary file because libpq rejects group-readable password files. The copy is removed on exit. Use a distinct evolution-postgres-runtime Secret with a restricted login for the later region pod; never mount migrator credentials into it. Rotation requires a new connection/Job; no hot reload is claimed.
deploy/kubernetes/postgres-migration/job.yaml.example is intentionally outside the
active Argo overlay: select a built immutable postgres-tools digest and verify DB
target/role before adding it. Existing default-deny egress needs a specific DB and
DNS allowance chosen for the actual endpoint. No live database/Secret was created
and no World0 resources are touched by this bootstrap.
CI builds the postgres-tools Docker target and publishes it when Gitea variable
HARBOR_POSTGRES_REPOSITORY is set (for example aevolution-postgres-tools). It uses
the existing HARBOR_PROJECT and Harbor robot secrets. Pin the reported registry
digest in the example Job; do not use the simulation image. See deploy/README.md.
Local Unix-socket integration is qualified; remote TLS/authentication, actual Secret
mounts and container execution still require environment-specific verification.