Review P1: the v2 attribute-only runtime role check accepted a login that inherits pg_write_all_data, which can UPDATE lease rows directly and bypass fencing. apply.sql now audits, on every migrate run, the runtime group and all transitive members: privileged attributes, any membership outside the group (inherited or SET-able), table privileges in evolution (including PUBLIC), CREATE rights and EXECUTE beyond the five fenced functions. 0002 and its checksum are unchanged. CI reproduces the bypass and proves each configuration is rejected and rolled back. Review P2: valid(LeasePolicy) bounds every term by the duration before arithmetic; LeaseAuthority validates durations before deadline math and renewal_unknown ignores impossible (>60s) and fences non-positive requests. Extreme min/max tests reproduce the old UBSan overflow and now pass. Validated: Windows CTest 55/55; WSL Release, clang-tidy and ASan/UBSan private-PostgreSQL suites. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
96 lines
4.7 KiB
PL/PgSQL
96 lines
4.7 KiB
PL/PgSQL
\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
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BEGIN;
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SET LOCAL search_path = pg_catalog;
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SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '10s';
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SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s';
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SELECT pg_catalog.pg_advisory_xact_lock(71420001);
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SELECT current_setting('server_version_num')::int = 180006 AS supported \gset
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\if :supported
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\else
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\echo 'Unsupported PostgreSQL version; expected 18.6'
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DO $$ BEGIN RAISE EXCEPTION 'unsupported PostgreSQL version'; END $$;
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\endif
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SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_catalog.pg_namespace WHERE nspname='evolution') AS exists \gset
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\if :exists
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-- Only an exact prefix of the checked-in history is admitted. Unknown or
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-- partial/foreign schemas fail closed; no IF NOT EXISTS repair of foreign data.
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SELECT coalesce(string_agg(version || ':' || sha256, ',' ORDER BY version), '')
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AS history FROM evolution.schema_migrations \gset
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SELECT :'history' = '1:' || :'migration_sha' AS at_v1,
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:'history' = '1:' || :'migration_sha' || ',2:' || :'migration_sha_2' AS at_v2 \gset
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\if :at_v2
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\elif :at_v1
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\ir 0002_region_fencing.sql
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\else
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\echo 'Unknown or changed migration history'
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DO $$ BEGIN RAISE EXCEPTION 'unknown or changed migration history'; END $$;
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\endif
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\else
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\ir 0001_region_bootstrap.sql
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\ir 0002_region_fencing.sql
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\endif
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-- Effective-privilege audit on every run, including no-ops (ADR-0060). Attributes
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-- alone are insufficient: predefined roles such as pg_write_all_data, PUBLIC
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-- grants or SET-able memberships would bypass the fenced functions. Checks the
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-- runtime group and every role that is (transitively) a member of it.
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SELECT pg_catalog.set_config('evolution.runtime_role', :'runtime_role', true);
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DO $$
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DECLARE
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runtime oid := (SELECT r.oid FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles r
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WHERE r.rolname = pg_catalog.current_setting('evolution.runtime_role'));
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bad text;
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BEGIN
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IF runtime IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'runtime role does not exist';
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END IF;
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WITH RECURSIVE closure(oid) AS (
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SELECT runtime
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UNION
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SELECT m.member FROM pg_catalog.pg_auth_members m JOIN closure c ON m.roleid = c.oid
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), fenced(oid) AS (VALUES
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('evolution.acquire_region_lease(evolution.u64,evolution.u64,integer)'::regprocedure::oid),
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('evolution.renew_region_lease(evolution.u64,evolution.u64,uuid,evolution.u64,integer)'::regprocedure::oid),
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('evolution.release_region_lease(evolution.u64,evolution.u64,uuid,evolution.u64)'::regprocedure::oid),
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('evolution.load_region_head(evolution.u64,evolution.u64)'::regprocedure::oid),
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('evolution.advance_region_head(evolution.u64,evolution.u64,uuid,evolution.u64,evolution.u64,uuid,bytea,uuid,bytea,evolution.u64)'::regprocedure::oid)
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), violations(role_oid, reason) AS (
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SELECT r.oid, 'privileged attribute or owner identity' FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles r
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JOIN closure c ON c.oid = r.oid
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WHERE r.rolsuper OR r.rolcreaterole OR r.rolcreatedb OR r.rolreplication
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OR r.rolbypassrls OR r.rolname = current_user
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UNION ALL
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-- Any membership outside the runtime closure (inherited or SET-able).
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SELECT m.member, 'membership outside the runtime group' FROM pg_catalog.pg_auth_members m
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JOIN closure c ON c.oid = m.member
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WHERE m.roleid NOT IN (SELECT oid FROM closure)
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UNION ALL
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SELECT c.oid, 'table privilege in evolution schema' FROM closure c
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CROSS JOIN pg_catalog.pg_class t
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WHERE t.relnamespace = 'evolution'::regnamespace AND t.relkind IN ('r', 'p', 'v', 'm', 'S')
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AND pg_catalog.has_table_privilege(c.oid, t.oid,
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'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE,TRUNCATE,REFERENCES,TRIGGER,MAINTAIN')
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UNION ALL
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SELECT c.oid, 'CREATE on schema or database' FROM closure c
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WHERE pg_catalog.has_schema_privilege(c.oid, 'evolution', 'CREATE')
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OR pg_catalog.has_database_privilege(c.oid, pg_catalog.current_database(), 'CREATE')
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OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_catalog.pg_namespace n WHERE n.nspname = 'public'
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AND pg_catalog.has_schema_privilege(c.oid, n.oid, 'CREATE'))
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UNION ALL
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-- Only the five guarded functions are executable; provisioning/internal are not.
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SELECT c.oid, 'EXECUTE outside the fenced function set' FROM closure c
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CROSS JOIN pg_catalog.pg_proc p
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WHERE p.pronamespace = 'evolution'::regnamespace
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AND p.oid NOT IN (SELECT oid FROM fenced)
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AND pg_catalog.has_function_privilege(c.oid, p.oid, 'EXECUTE')
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UNION ALL
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SELECT runtime, 'missing EXECUTE on a fenced function' FROM fenced f
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WHERE NOT pg_catalog.has_function_privilege(runtime, f.oid, 'EXECUTE')
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)
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SELECT pg_catalog.string_agg(DISTINCT v.reason, '; ') INTO bad FROM violations v;
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IF bad IS NOT NULL THEN
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-- Reasons only; no role names or connection details are printed.
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'runtime role audit failed: %', bad;
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END IF;
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END $$;
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COMMIT;
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