Add protocol v1: versioned, bounded frames (Hello, Welcome, Intent, IntentResult, environment/organism views, Close) carrying session, epoch and commit watermark, with an explicit little-endian canonical codec, a header-first FrameReader, seeded mutation tests and a libFuzzer target. SessionAdmission enforces world/region scope, grant lifetime and skew, single-use grants, one session per subject, epoch, replay, tick window and per-session rate. Dev identity is a 108-byte HMAC-SHA256 grant (PSA) that cannot be created or verified outside the dev environment. Transport security is TLS 1.3 only via pinned Mbed TLS 4.1.1 LTS with TLS 1.2, DTLS, tickets and PSK compiled out, AEAD suites, ECDHE groups and a pinned dev CA. Opt-in EVO_BUILD_NETWORK, new network CI suite. Sockets and region integration follow in M9.7. ADR-0082 records the decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.9 KiB
Authoritative network architecture
Status: locked server authority and untrusted clients; transport/reliability are proposals for M10. The scoped M9 dev session (TLS 1.3, protocol v1, dev-only grants) is specified in DEV_SESSION_PROTOCOL and ADR-0082. M0 has no networking. Steam distribution follows later through an identity-provider adapter; core account IDs are independent of Steam IDs.
flowchart LR
S[Steam identity provider] --> A[Identity adapter / backend]
C[Custom desktop client] <-->|HTTPS identity / world / history| A
A -->|short-lived region-scoped session grant| C
C -->|authenticated bounded intentions| R[Region network host]
R -->|ordered commands| W[Simulation owner]
W -->|views / outcomes| R
R -->|perceived deltas / ACKs / durable events| C
Channel contracts
| Channel | Information | Delivery contract |
|---|---|---|
| Realtime | Movement/orientation intentions and superseding snapshots | Prefer datagrams; sequence/drop obsolete state; bounded loss recovery |
| Reliable gameplay | Mutation choice, reproduction, death, region transfer | Idempotent action/event IDs; retry; outcome ACK after durable commit |
| Backend | Identity, world selection, friends, lineage/history/admin | HTTPS or justified gRPC; provider validation and least-privilege API scopes |
InputFrame includes protocol/session/region epoch, sequence, intended tick, bounded movement/orientation, action flags and validated interaction reference. Clients cannot author position, damage, energy, resources, genome, reproduction or death. Validate lengths, numeric ranges/non-finite values, sequence window, target relevance, session ownership, action prerequisites, rates and expiry before admitting bounded commands. Reject unsupported required protocol versions. Do not deserialize directly into trusted native structs.
Snapshot includes region/epoch, server tick, acknowledged simulated input sequence, baseline ID, perception-filtered state and events. Recovery also exposes the durable commit watermark. Receipt ACK means bytes accepted; simulated ACK means input applied; final biological outcome means durable. These are not aliases.
Prediction and interest boundaries
Client predicts only approved local motion using shared versioned rules. It keeps bounded unacknowledged intentions. On authoritative snapshot, restore local state at ACK, discard acknowledged inputs, replay remaining ones, and visually smooth correction. Remote entities interpolate buffered snapshots with bounded extrapolation; loss requests a fresh baseline. Death/mutation/reproduction remain server decisions. Bound retained baselines, input buffers and packet work.
Proposed interface: PerceptionView(observer, tick) → perceptible entity/field
facts; InterestPolicy(session, view, budget) → replication set and granularity.
Do spatial coarse filtering before biological perception. Poor vision cannot
receive hidden exact transforms; scent may expose a directional field, echolocation
a derived acoustic result. Rendering receives no arbitrary player/NPC/level labels.
Social friend identification is a separate authorized policy. Implement simple
spatial interest first; M0 does not implement sensory networking.
Reliability and security experiments
Compare established authenticated datagram/reliable transports (including a library-backed UDP security channel and QUIC options) against an owned selective reliability layer. Measure loss/reorder/duplication, head-of-line delay, MTU/ fragmentation, congestion, NAT routing, CPU, bandwidth and platform support. Do not choose raw unauthenticated UDP or invent cryptography. The final protocol ADR must name the maintained implementation, exact version, license, cipher configuration and threat review. Custom replication/game protocol does not require custom TLS, encryption, key exchange or random nonces.
Use short-lived world/region/account-scoped grants, authenticated key establishment, replay windows, rate/byte/work caps, server input scheduling windows and timeouts. Reconnect cannot duplicate control grants. Secrets never enter logs or gameplay snapshots. Network identities map to current ownership epoch; stale region responses/handoff tickets fail. Administrative APIs and storage credentials are separate from client sessions. Game workers have only region-scoped operations; a compromised process remains a threat requiring isolation and audit, not merely client validation.
Required tests before M10 acceptance: fabricated/oversized/truncated packets, NaN/overflow, replayed actions, sequence wrap/old baselines, duplicate/reordered reliable messages, speed/mutation/resource cheats, flooded sessions, dropped ACKs, lease/handoff races, reconnect uniqueness, sensory information leaks and bounded queue overload. Demonstrate 20+ simulated clients, then measure higher load with latency/loss and authoritative-state divergence reports.