Foundation / checks (deploy) (push) Successful in 3m24s
Foundation / checks (ecs) (push) Successful in 1m56s
Foundation / checks (client) (push) Successful in 12m18s
Foundation / checks (network) (push) Successful in 13m30s
Foundation / checks (tsan) (push) Successful in 8m0s
Foundation / checks (checks) (push) Successful in 32m39s
Foundation / checks (postgres) (push) Successful in 45m47s
Foundation / postgres-tools (push) Successful in 17s
Foundation / image (push) Successful in 2m30s
Foundation / server-image (push) Successful in 4m8s
ADR-0097. tools/ops/load-drill.sh (runbook docs/networking/M10_LOAD_DRILL.md) runs the evolution-dev reference qualification: synthetic inputs on for the run (the ADR-0073 drill-time override, restored on exit), bundle-mode evo-load bots through the public route, and each step's hold matched with the server's reports. evo-server logs "m10 load-report" every 10 s, since the agent cannot reach the ops port. evo-load gains --grants FILE --grants-per-bot C, exhausted=, hold_utc= and close_reasons=; evo-session-probe grants gains --accounts N. Finding: Mbed TLS/PSA are built without MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, and bots on different threads verifying their first connections at once were refused as untrusted (two per smoke run). One process-wide recursive crypto lock now guards every network-library entry point that touches them; the smoke went from 2/2 failing to 3/3 clean. quic-transport adds a concurrent-connect test. Refreshes the dev session window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
19 lines
904 B
C++
19 lines
904 B
C++
#pragma once
|
|
#include <mutex>
|
|
|
|
// M10.9d (ADR-0097): Mbed TLS and PSA are built without MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, so their
|
|
// global state (the PSA core, key slots, the random generator) is not safe to use from
|
|
// several threads at once. Every network-library entry point that touches them takes this
|
|
// one process-wide lock: the QUIC client's pinned certificate check and the session grant
|
|
// and handoff ticket keys. Recursive, since entry points may call each other. Calls are rare
|
|
// (per connection, per grant), so the lock costs nothing measurable. Found by evo-load: two
|
|
// bots on different threads verifying their first connections at once were refused as
|
|
// `untrusted`.
|
|
namespace evo::network {
|
|
inline std::recursive_mutex& crypto_mutex() noexcept {
|
|
static std::recursive_mutex mutex;
|
|
return mutex;
|
|
}
|
|
using CryptoLock = std::scoped_lock<std::recursive_mutex>;
|
|
} // namespace evo::network
|