Add M10.3a account-bound session grants and region session control
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Provider-independent 128-bit AccountIds; ECDSA P-256 session grants v1 signed by issuer keys and verified by regions with public keys only, the environment byte signed so dev grants never verify in stage or World0. Per-account serials make the newest grant win: replay and older stolen grants are refused, a newer grant replaces the account's session, and refresh renews in place. Attempt rates and capacities are bounded. The evo_identity library provides the provider, account directory and grant issuer interfaces with a dev-only test provider. ADR-0091. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -519,7 +519,9 @@ networking/M10_TIMING_TRACES.md); targets are not yet qualified on the reference
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hardware (10.9). 10.2 split: 10.2a selection, pins and build of msquic/OpenSSL done
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(ADR-0090); 10.2b bounded channels, exact CA pinning and the impairment relay done;
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10.2c loss/head-of-line measurements done (networking/M10_TRANSPORT_MEASUREMENTS.md).
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10.3-10.9 planned.
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10.3 split (ADR-0091): 10.3a account ids, ECDSA grants, identity adapter and region
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session control done; 10.3b QUIC session handshake and 10.3c durable control lease
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follow. 10.4-10.9 planned.
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**Entry:** M9 client/session evidence and M7/M8 dev/stage durability. Read
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NETWORK_ARCHITECTURE, PERSISTENCE_ARCHITECTURE and ADR-0017. The M9 transport is
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@@ -16,7 +16,11 @@ check authoritative, minimum-MTU start) and the owned impairment relay, tested o
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platforms. M10.2c measures loss and head-of-line blocking through the relay: under 5-10 %
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loss the ordered stream's p95 latency is 3-5.5x the datagram channel's and exceeds the
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250 ms target at 100 ms RTT, while datagrams stay <= 67 ms, which confirms the channel split
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(networking/M10_TRANSPORT_MEASUREMENTS.md). M10.2 is complete. Next: M10.3 session binding.
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(networking/M10_TRANSPORT_MEASUREMENTS.md). M10.2 is complete. M10.3a (ADR-0091) adds provider-independent account ids, ECDSA P-256
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session grants verified with public keys only, the identity adapter and grant issuer
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library, and per-region session control (newest grant wins and replaces the old session,
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replay and stale grants refused, in-session refresh, attempt rate limits). Next: M10.3b
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QUIC session handshake, then the durable control lease (10.3c).
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## Previous gate - 2026-10-02
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# ADR-0091: M10 session identity, grants and control authority
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## Status
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Accepted for M10.3 (2026-10-03). Decisions confirmed with the maintainer on 2026-10-03:
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ECDSA P-256 grants through Mbed TLS PSA; an identity adapter and grant issuer as a
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library (no service, no Steam yet); a newer grant replaces an account's existing
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session; unique control backed by a durable per-world control lease. Delivery:
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10.3a grants, identity adapter and region session control (this text);
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10.3b the QUIC session handshake; 10.3c the durable control lease. Each segment
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amends this ADR. The M9 dev path (ADR-0082/0083, protocol v1) is unchanged.
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## Context
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ADR-0017 and NETWORK_ARCHITECTURE require short-lived world/region/account-scoped
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grants, reconnect that cannot duplicate control, secrets kept out of logs, and an
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identity provider independent of Steam. ADR-0089 fixed that reconnect is a new grant,
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a new session and a fresh baseline, and that no session survives an epoch change.
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M9 has only dev grants: HMAC-SHA256, a u64 subject, refusal of a second session per
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subject, single use remembered in a file ledger. No account backend exists, and no
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controllable organism exists yet (organisms arrive with M11).
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## Decision
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**Accounts.** `AccountId` is 128 random bits assigned by the account directory and
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never derived from a provider id. Providers authenticate a credential to a
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`ProviderSubject` (provider kind plus opaque subject); the directory maps subjects to
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accounts. Logs and events may carry only `log_label` (the first four id bytes).
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**Grant format v1** (schemas/network/session-grant-v1.md): fixed 160 bytes,
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`EVO-GRANT` marker, version, environment byte, issuer key id, grant id, account,
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per-account serial, world/frame, region, issued/expiry seconds; ECDSA P-256 over
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SHA-256 of the first 96 bytes (Mbed TLS 4.1.1 PSA, already pinned; no new dependency).
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Issuers hold private keys (`GrantSigningKey`, non-exportable PSA keys); regions hold
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only public keys (`GrantVerifier`, at most 8 per environment for rotation), so a
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compromised region cannot mint grants. Verification checks the signature before any
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claim and then requires the signed environment byte to equal the verifier's.
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**Dev cannot reach production, by four independent checks:** M9 dev grants have
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another marker and length; a dev-signed session grant carries the dev environment
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byte and fails in stage/World0 even if a dev public key were misconfigured there;
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`DevTestProvider` (credential `dev-test:<name>`, no secret) cannot be constructed
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outside dev; `GrantIssuer` refuses a provider and key from different environments.
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**Serials order grants; the newest wins.** The directory issues per-account serials
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that strictly increase, with non-decreasing `issued_at`. A region accepts a grant only
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if its serial is greater than every serial it accepted for that account. This gives
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single use (replay is `stale_grant`) and makes an older unexpired grant, for example a
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stolen one, useless once a newer grant was presented. A region remembers an account's
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serial until the newest accepted `issued_at` plus its maximum lifetime, after which
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every older grant has expired.
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**Session control** (`SessionControl`, per region, single owner, transport-neutral):
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environment, world, region, lifetime (default maximum 300 s), clock skew (30 s),
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expiry and serial checks; at most one session per account. A valid newer grant for an
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account that holds a session closes the old session first and reports it as
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superseded, so control is never shared and a dropped client reconnects without waiting
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for the 5 s liveness timeout. `refresh` renews the session in place with a newer grant
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(no reconnect or new baseline); a session closes when its grant expires. An epoch
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change closes every session. Bounds: sessions (32), tracked accounts (4,096; full fails
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closed rather than forgetting serials), and attempt rates: region-wide attempts before
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signature verification (64 per 60 s) and verified attempts per account (4 per 60 s),
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counted whether or not accepted. A refused open (capacity) does not consume the grant.
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These limits are engineering defaults, not game rules.
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**Identity adapter** (`evo_identity`, library): `IdentityProvider`, `AccountDirectory`
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(bounded in-memory implementation for tests and tools), `GrantIssuer` (credential to
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signed grant, lifetime 1..3600 s). Production providers and a running issuer service
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are later work behind these interfaces.
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## Alternatives considered
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| Option | Disposition |
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|---|---|
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| HMAC grants per environment | Every region could forge grants for its environment. |
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| Ed25519 | Not in Mbed TLS; would need a new crypto dependency. |
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| Refuse a second login (M9 behaviour) | A silently dropped client waits for the liveness timeout; kept for M9 only. |
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| Per-grant single-use set | Does not stop an older unused grant (stolen) from taking control; serial ordering subsumes it. |
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| Grant lifetime as session lifetime without refresh | Short grants would force reconnects and fresh baselines every few minutes. |
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## Consequences and limits (10.3a)
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- Serials and sessions are in memory: a restarted region process would accept an
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already-used, still-unexpired grant again (bounded by the 300 s lifetime), and two
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regions of one world could each admit the same account. The durable control lease
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(10.3c) closes both. Until then nothing deploys M10 sessions.
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- If a newer grant is stolen before its owner presents it, the thief can take control
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until the owner presents a still newer grant. Grants travel only inside TLS and are
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never logged; revocation (bans) and channel binding are not designed yet.
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- Private-key provisioning: `GrantSigningKey::import` takes a raw 32-byte P-256 scalar;
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a provisioning tool and secret handling come with the issuer service.
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@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ design. No unadopted candidate is a link dependency of the proof.
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- [ADR-0084: Engineering UI toolkit](0084-engineering-ui-toolkit.md) - Dear ImGui 1.92.9b pinned (M9.8a) and integrated as the engineering client overlay with toolkit-first input routing (M9.8c).
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- [ADR-0090: M10 QUIC transport](0090-m10-quic-transport.md) - msquic 2.6.2 with OpenSSL 3.5.9 LTS (TLS 1.3 only) from pinned sources on Windows and Linux; DATAGRAM frames for superseding state, streams for reliable actions; M9 TLS/TCP kept as dev fallback; owned impairment relay; exact CA pinning due in 10.2b.
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- [ADR-0091: M10 session identity and control](0091-m10-session-identity-and-control.md) - provider-independent 128-bit AccountIds, ECDSA P-256 session grants (regions hold public keys only, signed environment byte), per-account serials where the newest grant wins, takeover of an existing session, in-session refresh, bounded attempt rates; identity adapter and issuer as a library; durable control lease follows (10.3c).
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- [ADR-0089: M10 timing and budgets](0089-m10-timing-and-budgets.md) - ratified 50 ms tick, 1 s flush with final outcomes p95 <= 1.5 s, responsiveness LAN p95 <= 150 ms / 100 ms RTT <= 250 ms, reference hardware; derived scheduling, sequence, baseline, queue/byte/work budgets and the exact/tolerant determinism contract; records the per-tick biology coupling.
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- [ADR-0088: Rendered deployment policy](0088-rendered-deployment-policy.md) - the deploy policy check renders every overlay with pinned kustomize v5.8.1 (checksum-verified, explicit preparation) and validates effective objects; unsupported kustomize features refused.
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- [ADR-0087: Dev session route](0087-dev-session-route.md) - evolution-dev only: void.aeternalisgames.com:7400 via a dedicated internal MetalLB VIP to the region pod, TLS end to end, CIDR-limited, operator-opened windows enforced by evo-server; committed disabled with fail-closed policy tests.
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@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ proposals for M10. M10 timing and workload budgets: ADR-0089 and
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with OpenSSL (ADR-0090): bounded DATAGRAM and reliable-stream channels with exact CA
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pinning (`evo_network_quic`, M10.2b); loss/head-of-line measurements (M10.2c,
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[M10_TRANSPORT_MEASUREMENTS](../networking/M10_TRANSPORT_MEASUREMENTS.md)) confirm
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superseding state on DATAGRAMs and reliable actions on the ordered stream. The scoped M9 dev session (TLS 1.3, protocol v1, dev-only grants)
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superseding state on DATAGRAMs and reliable actions on the ordered stream. Session
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identity and control (ADR-0091, M10.3): ECDSA-signed account-scoped grants
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([session-grant-v1](../../schemas/network/session-grant-v1.md)), newest grant wins. The scoped M9 dev session (TLS 1.3, protocol v1, dev-only grants)
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is specified in [DEV_SESSION_PROTOCOL](../networking/DEV_SESSION_PROTOCOL.md) and
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ADR-0082. M0 has no networking. Steam distribution follows later through
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an identity-provider adapter; core account IDs are independent of Steam IDs.
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@@ -4087,7 +4087,37 @@ extension was negotiated (measurement now waits for it); clang-tidy widening fin
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Executed: Linux format check, GCC 14 build, CTest `-L quic` 2/2, clang-tidy 19 on the tool
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and relay; Windows MSVC preset `quic` build and CTest 3/3; both measurement runs.
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Correction (later the same day): the Windows build preceded the final formatting pass,
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which sorted `<timeapi.h>` before `<windows.h>`; the committed tool did not compile with
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MSVC. Fixed in the next commit (separate include block); MSVC preset `quic` rebuilt, CTest
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3/3 and a 2 s measurement run. The `-Action test` step of windows-check does not build:
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always run `-Action build` first.
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Limits: no kernel TCP/netem comparison (user-space relay by decision), single host and
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loopback, development hardware, 15 samples of 16 KiB messages per configuration, run
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length cuts off in-flight stream messages; msquic not under sanitizers; quic preset not
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in CI.
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## 2026-10-03 — M10.3a session grants, identity adapter and session control (ADR-0091)
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Implemented `SessionControl` and `AccountId` (evo_network_protocol), ECDSA P-256 session
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grants `GrantSigningKey`/`GrantVerifier` (evo_network_tls, Mbed TLS PSA) and the identity
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adapter `evo_identity` (DevTestProvider, MemoryAccountDirectory, GrantIssuer); tests in
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`tests/network_control.cpp` (part of `evo-network-tests`, label `network`).
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Tests: sign/verify round trip; every one of the 160 grant bytes flipped is refused (key
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id bytes as unknown key, others as bad signature); truncated and M9 dev grants refused;
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dev-signed grants refused by stage and World0 verifiers with and without the dev public
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key configured; key rotation, duplicate and excess keys, relabelled key id, invalid
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point, key import and moved-from keys; DevTestProvider refused outside dev, credential
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syntax; directory stability, capacity and serial/issue-time monotonicity; issuer end to
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end into session control and environment mismatch; control scope (world, region,
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environment), lifetime, skew and expiry; replay and older unexpired grants refused
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(`stale_grant`), newest grant superseding the previous session, account and region
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attempt limits with window reset, refused open not consuming the grant, account capacity
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failing closed until older grants can no longer verify, refresh (extension, stale,
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wrong account, unknown session), grant expiry and epoch change closing sessions; log label.
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Executed: Linux GCC 14 preset `network` build and CTest `-L network` 1/1; Clang 19
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ASan/UBSan (Debug, leak detection) `evo-network-tests`; clang-tidy 19 on the new sources
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and tests; format check; Windows MSVC 19.44 preset `network` build and CTest 1/1.
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Not done: QUIC session handshake (10.3b), durable control lease and serial persistence
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across restarts and regions (10.3c), revocation, private-key provisioning tooling.
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