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ADR-0090 records the maintainer's selection of msquic 2.6.2 with OpenSSL 3.5.9 LTS built from pinned, checksum-verified sources on Windows and Linux (plus the xdp-for-windows headers msquic needs on Windows), the trust, threading and channel model, and the known gap that OpenSSL's verifier also trusts its default paths. Adds the opt-in quic preset, explicit preparation, and a loopback smoke test (datagram, stream, untrusted CA and wrong name refused) passing on MSVC and GCC. windows-check picks up newly installed Perl/NASM and pins cl. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
86 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
86 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
# Authoritative network architecture
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Status: locked server authority and untrusted clients; transport/reliability are
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proposals for M10. M10 timing and workload budgets: ADR-0089 and
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[m10-budgets-v1](../../schemas/network/m10-budgets-v1.md). M10 transport: QUIC via msquic
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with OpenSSL (ADR-0090); channels and impairment tests follow in M10.2b. The scoped M9 dev session (TLS 1.3, protocol v1, dev-only grants)
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is specified in [DEV_SESSION_PROTOCOL](../networking/DEV_SESSION_PROTOCOL.md) and
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ADR-0082. M0 has no networking. Steam distribution follows later through
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an identity-provider adapter; core account IDs are independent of Steam IDs.
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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S[Steam identity provider] --> A[Identity adapter / backend]
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C[Custom desktop client] <-->|HTTPS identity / world / history| A
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A -->|short-lived region-scoped session grant| C
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C -->|authenticated bounded intentions| R[Region network host]
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R -->|ordered commands| W[Simulation owner]
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W -->|views / outcomes| R
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R -->|perceived deltas / ACKs / durable events| C
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```
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## Channel contracts
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| Channel | Information | Delivery contract |
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|---|---|---|
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| Realtime | Movement/orientation intentions and superseding snapshots | Prefer datagrams; sequence/drop obsolete state; bounded loss recovery |
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| Reliable gameplay | Mutation choice, reproduction, death, region transfer | Idempotent action/event IDs; retry; outcome ACK after durable commit |
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| Backend | Identity, world selection, friends, lineage/history/admin | HTTPS or justified gRPC; provider validation and least-privilege API scopes |
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InputFrame includes protocol/session/region epoch, sequence, intended tick,
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bounded movement/orientation, action flags and validated interaction reference.
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Clients cannot author position, damage, energy, resources, genome, reproduction
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or death. Validate lengths, numeric ranges/non-finite values, sequence window,
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target relevance, session ownership, action prerequisites, rates and expiry
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before admitting bounded commands. Reject unsupported required protocol versions.
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Do not deserialize directly into trusted native structs.
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Snapshot includes region/epoch, server tick, acknowledged simulated input sequence,
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baseline ID, perception-filtered state and events. Recovery also exposes the
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durable commit watermark. Receipt ACK means bytes accepted; simulated ACK means
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input applied; final biological outcome means durable. These are not aliases.
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## Prediction and interest boundaries
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Client predicts only approved local motion using shared versioned rules. It keeps
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bounded unacknowledged intentions. On authoritative snapshot, restore local state
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at ACK, discard acknowledged inputs, replay remaining ones, and visually smooth
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correction. Remote entities interpolate buffered snapshots with bounded
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extrapolation; loss requests a fresh baseline. Death/mutation/reproduction remain
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server decisions. Bound retained baselines, input buffers and packet work.
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Proposed interface: `PerceptionView(observer, tick)` → perceptible entity/field
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facts; `InterestPolicy(session, view, budget)` → replication set and granularity.
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Do spatial coarse filtering before biological perception. Poor vision cannot
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receive hidden exact transforms; scent may expose a directional field, echolocation
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a derived acoustic result. Rendering receives no arbitrary player/NPC/level labels.
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Social friend identification is a separate authorized policy. Implement simple
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spatial interest first; M0 does not implement sensory networking.
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## Reliability and security experiments
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Compare established authenticated datagram/reliable transports (including a
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library-backed UDP security channel and QUIC options) against an owned selective
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reliability layer. Measure loss/reorder/duplication, head-of-line delay, MTU/
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fragmentation, congestion, NAT routing, CPU, bandwidth and platform support.
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Do not choose raw unauthenticated UDP or invent cryptography. The final protocol
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ADR must name the maintained implementation, exact version, license, cipher
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configuration and threat review. Custom replication/game protocol does not
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require custom TLS, encryption, key exchange or random nonces.
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Use short-lived world/region/account-scoped grants, authenticated key establishment,
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replay windows, rate/byte/work caps, server input scheduling windows and timeouts.
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Reconnect cannot duplicate control grants. Secrets never enter logs or gameplay
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snapshots. Network identities map to current ownership epoch; stale region
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responses/handoff tickets fail. Administrative APIs and storage credentials are
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separate from client sessions. Game workers have only region-scoped operations;
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a compromised process remains a threat requiring isolation and audit, not merely
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client validation.
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Required tests before M10 acceptance: fabricated/oversized/truncated packets,
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NaN/overflow, replayed actions, sequence wrap/old baselines, duplicate/reordered
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reliable messages, speed/mutation/resource cheats, flooded sessions, dropped ACKs,
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lease/handoff races, reconnect uniqueness, sensory information leaks and bounded
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queue overload. Demonstrate 20+ simulated clients, then measure higher load with
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latency/loss and authoritative-state divergence reports.
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