5.3 KiB
ADR-0020: Gitea delivery and a manual dev verification Job
Status
Accepted for the foundation delivery requested by the maintainer. This does not adopt a persistent server deployment. Registry/runner placeholders are explicitly permitted; the maintainer will create the Argo application manually.
Context
The repository is hosted at git.aeternalisgames.com/dingo/AEvolution. Harbor is registry.aeternalisgames.com, project aeternalis, repository aevolution. The maintainer's successful run 1399 confirms the ubuntu-22.04 runner label and robot secret names. The Argo source is not yet inspected. The executable is a finite headless proof; it has neither a serving loop nor durable world ownership.
Decision
Use native Gitea Actions with a configurable Linux Docker runner. Build Linux checks in explicit container stages: GCC14 Debug/Release, LLVM19 formatting and analysis, ASan/UBSan, seeded bounded fuzzing, and a separate TSan job. Keep the existing Windows check script for the verified MSVC development workflow.
After checks, build and smoke-test the runtime image. Publish from main only when the Harbor project is configured, using separately scoped robot secrets. Emit a unique commit/run tag and the registry digest. No cluster or Argo credentials go into CI. Review and commit the digest to dev Kustomize before manual Argo sync.
Deploy the proof as a finite, stateless Sync-hook Job in evolution-dev. No Service, PVC, database, region process, scheduled run or World0 resource is introduced. Keep bootstrap Argo/project/namespace templates outside the workload source path. An unresolved image marker deliberately cannot run. The operator must replace it.
Alternatives Considered
GitHub workflows would target the wrong forge. A Deployment would restart a successful finite process. A CronJob introduces unrequested recurring work. Cluster build privileges and Argo credentials are unnecessary for this manual delivery path. Host-installed compilers are less explicit than container stages. Argo Workflows remains the later orchestrator for soak/clone/migration jobs.
Benefits
One executable crosses build, container and Kubernetes boundaries without adding simulation dependencies. Publishing and deployment remain independently reviewable. The application needs no runtime network access or persistent state.
Costs
The existing Linux Docker runner and Harbor project/robots are reused. Container checks consume builder cache and require trusted package repositories. Dev bootstrap uses an Ubuntu tag; distro package versions are captured, not fully reproducible. Production promotion requires a reviewed base digest, retained SBOM, scan/signature and package provenance; this scaffold is not that release gate.
Risks
Docker access is privileged: use isolated runners for untrusted contributions and never grant them production credentials. TSan may expose host-runtime limitations; do not bypass a failed job or weaken host security to conceal them. Jobs can run more than once; this is safe only because the proof has no external side effects. Manual sync is an operational action even though the workload is bounded.
Consequences
The latest completed hook stays available until the next full sync replaces it. Collect logs first; selective sync skips hooks. No automated sync, prune, cascade finalizer or namespace-creation option is enabled. Persistent deployment decisions remain under ADR-0018 and M7/M8 gates. A workflow existing is not evidence it ran.
Sources: Gitea variables, Gitea runner, Argo hooks, Kubernetes Jobs.
TSan test-container exception (2026-09-19)
Run 1400 demonstrated Clang19 failing before main because Docker's build sandbox blocked personality(ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE). Compile TSan in the image build, then run CTest in a non-root, networkless, capability-free container with a read-only root and bounded tmpfs test-output directories. No host ASLR/sysctl change and no seccomp=unconfined or privileged container is used.
The CI profile generator downloads Moby's maintained Apache-2.0 default seccomp profile at commit 245180c51918481c0525424b3ee025d2b435d46c and verifies SHA256 785b2429264afba4d594320337cb17f144f3c7d51585f9805eef72e28f4f9334. It adds exactly one argument-constrained allow rule: personality(0x40000), PER_LINUX with ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE. This deliberately disables ASLR only for sanitizer processes requiring a fixed shadow layout. All other default rules remain. The profile is not part of the game image or Kubernetes runtime configuration. Review/removal owner: foundation/toolchain maintainers when TSan no longer requires this call. The tradeoff is a pinned upstream network fetch and profile maintenance, rather than vendoring a large allowlist or permitting every syscall. Failed tests still block publication.
Evidence: Docker seccomp, LLVM19 runtime, pinned Moby profile.