38 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
38 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
[Reviewed]
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# ADR-0017: Network transport and security
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## Status
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Transport proposed; server authority/no custom cryptography locked.
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[ADR-0082](0082-dev-session-transport.md) applies this to the M9 dev session only
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(TLS 1.3 over a stream with Mbed TLS 4.1.1); the M10 transport remains open.
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## Context
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Superseding state and durable decisions need distinct delivery and trust contracts.
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## Decision
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Keep application semantics transport-neutral; compare QUIC streams+DATAGRAM with DTLS-protected UDP plus mature reliability. Own replication/perception/application logic; use maintained crypto implementations.
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## Alternatives Considered
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TCP/TLS all traffic is simple but head-of-line behavior needs measurement; early Steam-specific coupling limits portability; homemade encrypted transport rejected.
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## Benefits
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Established security with perception-aware replication and independent identity provider.
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## Costs
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Reconnect/channel/window/rate/epoch tests and dependency review.
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## Risks
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Replay/parser abuse, hidden-information leakage, obsolete crypto and compromised workers.
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## Consequences
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Measure loss/latency/MTU/NAT/platforms/binary size/license/maintenance, then pin. Fuzz and adversarial tests gate multiplayer. Worker compromise requires scoped durable constraints/audit, not only client authority. [QUIC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000.html), [DATAGRAM](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9221/), [DTLS1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147/).
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