Website fixes:
- /how-to-play and /ai-assets and /ai-assets/report: add explicit @page routes
(default Razor Pages routes were PascalCase, nav links used kebab-case)
- Webclient: redirect to webclient.aeternalisgames.com instead of /webclient/app
- Login: accept display name (username) or email; looks up by email first, then
by DisplayName — uses TUser overload of PasswordSignInAsync with lockout support
Leaderboard:
- Add GamesPlayed, GamesWon, WinRate columns
- Inject GameDbContext; query completed sessions for the top-N account IDs and
aggregate wins/plays in memory (cross-schema, no EF join)
News CMS:
- NewsPost entity in catalog schema (slug, title, summary, bodyHtml, heroImageUrl,
author, published state, timestamps)
- CatalogDbContext: add DbSet<NewsPost> + model config
- Migration: 20260423000001_AddNewsPosts
- Website Program.cs: register AddGameDatabase
- News/Index.cshtml: list published posts with hero image + summary
- News/Post.cshtml: individual post detail page at /news/{slug}
- Admin NewsPostList.razor: list all posts, delete with confirm modal
- Admin NewsPostEditor.razor: full CRUD editor — title, slug (auto from title),
summary, HTML body with live preview toggle, hero image with preview,
publish toggle + date/time, author
- Admin NavMenu: add Website section with News Posts link
CDN art:
- Index.cshtml.cs: inject IConfiguration, expose CdnBaseUrl
- Index.cshtml: add hero-bg-img <img> sourced from {cdnBase}/website/hero-bg.jpg
(upload hero-bg.jpg to CDN /website/ to activate; no image = no broken element)
Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
via [Happy](https://happy.engineering)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Happy <yesreply@happy.engineering>
269 lines
14 KiB
C#
269 lines
14 KiB
C#
// SOR.Website — Public game website and player account portal
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//
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// This is the entry point for aeternalisgames.com. It runs independently of
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// SOR.Host and connects to the same databases (Identity, Catalog) so player
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// accounts created here work immediately in the game client.
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//
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// Security design:
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// - All HTML rendered by Razor Pages is HTML-encoded by default (XSS impossible).
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// - Content-Security-Policy blocks all inline scripts/styles (SecurityHeadersMiddleware).
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// - Anti-forgery tokens are validated on every POST handler (Razor Pages default).
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// - Auth cookie uses __Host- prefix: forces Secure, Path=/, and no Domain attribute.
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// - Data Protection keys stored in Redis: all pods decrypt each other's cookies.
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// - Rate limiting applied per-IP to all auth endpoints.
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// - Forwarded-header trust enables accurate IP tracking behind the ingress.
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using System.Threading.RateLimiting;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Cookies;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.HttpOverrides;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection;
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using Serilog;
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using StackExchange.Redis;
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using SOR.Database;
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using SOR.Database.Contexts;
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using SOR.Database.Entities.Identity;
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using SOR.Website;
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var builder = WebApplication.CreateBuilder(args);
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// ── Logging ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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builder.Host.UseSerilog((ctx, cfg) =>
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cfg.ReadFrom.Configuration(ctx.Configuration));
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// ── Redis ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Create the Redis connection eagerly so DataProtection can share it.
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var redisConnectionString = builder.Configuration.GetConnectionString("Redis") ?? "localhost:6379";
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var redisConfig = ConfigurationOptions.Parse(redisConnectionString);
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redisConfig.AbortOnConnectFail = false;
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var redis = ConnectionMultiplexer.Connect(redisConfig);
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builder.Services.AddSingleton<IConnectionMultiplexer>(redis);
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// ── DataProtection ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Persist keys in Redis so all pod replicas can decrypt each other's session cookies.
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// SetApplicationName ensures cookie protection is scoped to this app — different apps
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// sharing the same Redis instance cannot accidentally decrypt each other's cookies.
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builder.Services.AddDataProtection()
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.PersistKeysToStackExchangeRedis(redis, "SOR.Website:DataProtection-Keys")
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.SetApplicationName("SOR.Website");
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// ── Identity databases ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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builder.Services.AddIdentityDatabase(builder.Configuration);
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builder.Services.AddCatalogDatabase(builder.Configuration);
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builder.Services.AddGameDatabase(builder.Configuration);
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// ── ASP.NET Core Identity ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Registers UserManager<Account>, SignInManager<Account>, and all token providers.
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// Password rules and lockout here MUST match SOR.Auth/ServiceRegistration.cs so that
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// passwords set via the website are accepted by the game client and vice versa.
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builder.Services.AddIdentity<Account, IdentityRole<Guid>>(options =>
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{
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// Password policy (must match SOR.Auth)
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options.Password.RequireDigit = true;
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options.Password.RequireUppercase = true;
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options.Password.RequireNonAlphanumeric = true;
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options.Password.RequiredLength = 8;
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// Account lockout after 5 failed attempts
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options.Lockout.MaxFailedAccessAttempts = 5;
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options.Lockout.DefaultLockoutTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30);
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options.Lockout.AllowedForNewUsers = true;
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// Email is the unique login identifier
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options.User.RequireUniqueEmail = true;
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// Email verification is advisory for now (players can play before verifying).
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// Set RequireConfirmedEmail = true when an email provider is configured.
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options.SignIn.RequireConfirmedEmail = false;
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})
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.AddEntityFrameworkStores<SorIdentityDbContext>()
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.AddDefaultTokenProviders();
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// ── Cookie configuration ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// AddIdentity registers the application cookie automatically.
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// ConfigureApplicationCookie overrides the defaults to apply maximum security.
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//
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// __Host- prefix requirements (enforced by the browser, not us):
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// - The Secure attribute must be set.
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// - The Path attribute must be "/".
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// - The Domain attribute must NOT be set.
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// Together these prevent the cookie from being set by a subdomain compromise
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// and ensure it is never sent over plain HTTP even if a redirect occurs.
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builder.Services.ConfigureApplicationCookie(opts =>
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{
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opts.Cookie.Name = "__Host-sor-web-session";
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opts.Cookie.HttpOnly = true; // inaccessible to JavaScript — blocks XSS token theft
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opts.Cookie.SecurePolicy = CookieSecurePolicy.Always; // never sent over HTTP
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opts.Cookie.SameSite = SameSiteMode.Strict; // never sent on cross-site requests
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opts.Cookie.Path = "/"; // required for __Host- prefix
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opts.LoginPath = "/auth/login";
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opts.LogoutPath = "/auth/logout";
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opts.AccessDeniedPath = "/auth/login"; // unauthorized → login, not 403 page
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opts.ReturnUrlParameter = "returnUrl"; // param name in /auth/login?returnUrl=...
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opts.SlidingExpiration = true;
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opts.ExpireTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromDays(14);
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// SecurityStampValidator re-checks the stamp every 30 minutes by default.
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// This means password changes and bans take effect within that window
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// without a full DB hit on every single request.
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});
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// ── Anti-forgery ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Razor Pages validates anti-forgery tokens on every POST handler by default.
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// We apply the same strict cookie security as the session cookie.
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// The HeaderName allows JavaScript fetch requests to send the token via header
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// rather than form body (needed for AJAX calls with JSON bodies).
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builder.Services.AddAntiforgery(opts =>
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{
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opts.Cookie.Name = "__Host-sor-csrf";
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opts.Cookie.HttpOnly = true;
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opts.Cookie.SecurePolicy = CookieSecurePolicy.Always;
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opts.Cookie.SameSite = SameSiteMode.Strict;
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opts.Cookie.Path = "/";
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opts.HeaderName = "X-CSRF-TOKEN";
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});
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// ── Razor Pages ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// AuthorizeFolder("/Account") applies [Authorize] to every page under /Account.
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// No individual page needs the attribute — it is enforced at the routing layer.
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// This is the privilege-escalation control: unauthenticated requests to any
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// /Account/* page are automatically redirected to /auth/login?returnUrl=...
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builder.Services.AddRazorPages(opts =>
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{
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opts.Conventions.AuthorizeFolder("/Account");
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});
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// ── Rate limiting ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Applied per-IP address to auth endpoints to slow brute-force attacks.
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// IP is obtained from the RemoteIpAddress, which reflects the real client IP
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// because UseForwardedHeaders() is applied early in the pipeline below.
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//
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// Policies are applied via [EnableRateLimiting("policy-name")] on page models.
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builder.Services.AddRateLimiter(opts =>
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{
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opts.RejectionStatusCode = StatusCodes.Status429TooManyRequests;
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// Login: 10 attempts per IP per 5 minutes
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opts.AddPolicy("auth-login", httpCtx =>
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RateLimitPartition.GetFixedWindowLimiter(
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partitionKey: httpCtx.Connection.RemoteIpAddress?.ToString() ?? "unknown",
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factory: _ => new FixedWindowRateLimiterOptions
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{
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PermitLimit = 10,
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Window = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5),
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QueueProcessingOrder = QueueProcessingOrder.OldestFirst,
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QueueLimit = 0,
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}));
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// Registration: 5 per IP per hour
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opts.AddPolicy("auth-register", httpCtx =>
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RateLimitPartition.GetFixedWindowLimiter(
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partitionKey: httpCtx.Connection.RemoteIpAddress?.ToString() ?? "unknown",
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factory: _ => new FixedWindowRateLimiterOptions
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{
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PermitLimit = 5,
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Window = TimeSpan.FromHours(1),
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QueueProcessingOrder = QueueProcessingOrder.OldestFirst,
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QueueLimit = 0,
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}));
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// Password reset: 3 per IP per 15 minutes
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opts.AddPolicy("auth-reset", httpCtx =>
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RateLimitPartition.GetFixedWindowLimiter(
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partitionKey: httpCtx.Connection.RemoteIpAddress?.ToString() ?? "unknown",
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factory: _ => new FixedWindowRateLimiterOptions
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{
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PermitLimit = 3,
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Window = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(15),
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QueueProcessingOrder = QueueProcessingOrder.OldestFirst,
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QueueLimit = 0,
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}));
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});
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// ── Forwarded headers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// The pod runs plain HTTP behind a TLS-terminating ingress (nginx/Traefik/etc.).
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// Without this, ASP.NET Core sees the ingress IP as the client, breaking rate
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// limiting (all clients appear to share one IP) and HSTS redirect logic.
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// Clearing KnownNetworks/KnownProxies trusts any upstream proxy — safe because
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// the pod is only reachable from within the cluster network.
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builder.Services.Configure<ForwardedHeadersOptions>(opts =>
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{
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opts.ForwardedHeaders =
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ForwardedHeaders.XForwardedFor |
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ForwardedHeaders.XForwardedProto |
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ForwardedHeaders.XForwardedHost;
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opts.KnownNetworks.Clear();
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opts.KnownProxies.Clear();
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});
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// ── Health checks ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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builder.Services.AddHealthChecks();
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// ── BUILD ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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var app = builder.Build();
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// ── Middleware pipeline ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Order is critical. Each line's comment explains why it must be at this position.
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// 1. Forwarded headers: must be first so all subsequent middleware sees the
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// real client IP, scheme, and host from proxy headers.
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app.UseForwardedHeaders();
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if (!app.Environment.IsDevelopment())
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{
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// 2a. Exception handler in production: inline so it never redirects to a
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// protected route that would trigger an auth challenge loop.
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app.UseExceptionHandler(err => err.Run(async ctx =>
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{
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ctx.Response.StatusCode = 500;
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ctx.Response.ContentType = "text/html; charset=utf-8";
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await ctx.Response.WriteAsync(
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"<!DOCTYPE html><html><body><h1>An error occurred.</h1></body></html>");
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}));
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// 2b. HSTS: instructs browsers to always use HTTPS for this domain.
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// The ingress terminates TLS; the pod itself is plain HTTP.
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// UseHttpsRedirection is intentionally omitted — the pod never receives
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// HTTPS directly, so redirecting would cause an infinite loop.
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app.UseHsts();
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}
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// 3. Security headers: must come before static files so every response (including
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// CSS, JS, images) carries the full security header set.
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app.UseMiddleware<SecurityHeadersMiddleware>();
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// 4. Static files: serves wwwroot/ content.
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// Comes before routing so requests for .css/.js/.png etc. short-circuit here
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// without hitting the Razor Pages routing layer.
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app.UseStaticFiles();
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// 5. Routing: maps URL paths to page handlers.
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app.UseRouting();
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// 6. Rate limiting: must come after UseRouting (needs endpoint metadata) and
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// before UseAuthentication (so we can reject before doing any DB work).
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app.UseRateLimiter();
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// 7. Authentication: reads the __Host-sor-web-session cookie and populates
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// HttpContext.User with the signed-in Account's claims.
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app.UseAuthentication();
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// 8. Authorization: enforces [Authorize] and AuthorizeFolder conventions.
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// Must come after UseAuthentication.
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app.UseAuthorization();
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// ── Endpoints ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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app.MapRazorPages();
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// Health check: AllowAnonymous so Kubernetes probes work before any session exists.
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app.MapHealthChecks("/health").AllowAnonymous();
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// ── RUN ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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Log.Information("SOR.Website starting");
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await app.RunAsync();
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