Add protocol v1: versioned, bounded frames (Hello, Welcome, Intent, IntentResult, environment/organism views, Close) carrying session, epoch and commit watermark, with an explicit little-endian canonical codec, a header-first FrameReader, seeded mutation tests and a libFuzzer target. SessionAdmission enforces world/region scope, grant lifetime and skew, single-use grants, one session per subject, epoch, replay, tick window and per-session rate. Dev identity is a 108-byte HMAC-SHA256 grant (PSA) that cannot be created or verified outside the dev environment. Transport security is TLS 1.3 only via pinned Mbed TLS 4.1.1 LTS with TLS 1.2, DTLS, tickets and PSK compiled out, AEAD suites, ECDHE groups and a pinned dev CA. Opt-in EVO_BUILD_NETWORK, new network CI suite. Sockets and region integration follow in M9.7. ADR-0082 records the decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
37 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
37 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-0017: Network transport and security
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## Status
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Transport proposed; server authority/no custom cryptography locked.
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[ADR-0082](0082-dev-session-transport.md) applies this to the M9 dev session only
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(TLS 1.3 over a stream with Mbed TLS 4.1.1); the M10 transport remains open.
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## Context
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Superseding state and durable decisions need distinct delivery and trust contracts.
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## Decision
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Keep application semantics transport-neutral; compare QUIC streams+DATAGRAM with DTLS-protected UDP plus mature reliability. Own replication/perception/application logic; use maintained crypto implementations.
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## Alternatives Considered
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TCP/TLS all traffic is simple but head-of-line behavior needs measurement; early Steam-specific coupling limits portability; homemade encrypted transport rejected.
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## Benefits
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Established security with perception-aware replication and independent identity provider.
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## Costs
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Reconnect/channel/window/rate/epoch tests and dependency review.
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## Risks
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Replay/parser abuse, hidden-information leakage, obsolete crypto and compromised workers.
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## Consequences
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Measure loss/latency/MTU/NAT/platforms/binary size/license/maintenance, then pin. Fuzz and adversarial tests gate multiplayer. Worker compromise requires scoped durable constraints/audit, not only client authority. [QUIC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000.html), [DATAGRAM](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9221/), [DTLS1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147/).
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